Our latest columnist, Alethea Osborne, offers a comprehensive breakdown of the situation in Mali.
The recent Algerian hostage crisis has swung a country that was previously relatively unknown, Mali, into global view. Many people would have been unaware of its existence, let alone its political situation, before the French intervention in the country in order to tackle the Islamic military presence there. It is vital, therefore, to clear up a few misconceptions about the situation which are often left unclear through press coverage.
The presence of more extreme Islamists in the north is to a certain extent the result of Gaddafi’s demise in Libya. The Tuareg are an ethnic group and historically Mali’s strongest opposition. During the reign of Gaddafi many were recruited to join the Libyan army and so gained military training and arms. Since the Arab Spring and Gaddafi’s downfall they have returned to their homes in northern Mali and quickly joined or created Islamist or Nationalist groups, providing them with key arms and military experience. However, the speed at which rebellions broke out after Gaddafi’s death indicate that there was a strong framework already in place before their return.
It is clearly easier when referring to the rebel groups in the North to simply refer to them as ‘terrorists’ or ‘Islamists’, however it is vital to understand that there is not simply one united group. In fact, there are at least four major groups in the region, ranging from the MNLA, who are more nationalist than Islamist and have offered to work with Western forces, to Mokhtar Belmohktar’s Al-Qaida-influenced The Signatories in Blood, who take credit for the recent Algerian hostage crisis. The very concept of Al-Qaida’s influence is one that needs to be explained, while the AQIM (Al-Qaida in the Maghreb) may have certain tactics similar to those of Bin Laden’s Al-Qaida, they are far more like a franchise which is run separately and with individual, mainly far more regional and economic-based, objectives. Yet, the idea of links to Al-Qaida works more easily within Western media and governments’ rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’. It also justifies the French military presence in the country, despite the clear evidence that Western intervention in the last decade has more often than not helped boost support for jihadist groups and created a clearer Western enemy for often originally more regionally-focused groups.
The French were invited by the Malian government to help stabilise the situation and support the Malian army in trying to suppress the uprising in the North. It is important to point out though that the Malian government itself is very unstable, with two changes of rule in the last nine months, including a military coup. This has resulted in no clear representative leader and large political divisions in the country. So the French, while asked to come, received this invitation from an unelected leaderless government. It also suggests that there was no other plan put in place except the hope of Western intervention; blatantly untrue, as there was one proposed by the West African regional bloc Ecowas and approved by the United Nations Security Council. It included providing 3,000 West African troops to support the Malian army, but placed a large weight on the importance of negotiation and the potential harmful effects of military intervention.
It is completely comprehensible that it is often easier to simplify situations in order to explain them, but it is important to understand the basic facts concerning the key players in a conflict before they get too diluted in political rhetoric.
exeposedev 